Dissatisfi ed public employees put at risk the quality of service delivery. Th is study investigates pay dissatisfaction among a sample (N=501) of municipal employees in Russia's Stavropol region. We fi nd that pay dissatisfaction results from negative perceptions of public employment compensation, low levels of risk aversion, unethical professional attitudes, and more than 4 years of working experience. Our fi ndings suggest that municipal employees are sensitive to multiple wage gaps within the public sector, and that upward pay comparisons are a relevant predictor of dissatisfaction with pay. We conclude that widespread pay dissatisfaction poses a serious threat to the implementation of federal programs and sustainable rural development in Russia.
Introduction
Happy civil servants display higher levels of altruism (Homberg et al. 2015; Park and Rainey 2008) , are more productive, creative, and more likely to remain with their employer (Moynihan and Pandey 2008; Vandenabeele and Van Loon 2015) . In contrast, public employees facing confusion and confl ict about their role in the workplace, frustration over red tape, a lack of variety in the workplace (Wright and Davis 2003) , or poor management (Bertelli 2007) are likely to become self-focused, aggressive and antisocial (Ellickson and Logsdon 2002 ) -all of which puts at risk the quality of service delivery and public trust in government. Hence, job satisfac-tion is the most popular job attitude studied in public management research (Day and Schleicher 2012; Homberg et al. 2015; Vandenabeele and Van Loon 2015) .
Pay satisfaction is a major facet of liking one's job (Cantarelli et al. 2016; Ellickson and Logsdon 2002; Llorens 2015; Ting 1997 ) but varies widely across countries. While federal employees in the US are quite satisfi ed with their pay scales (Pitts et al. 2011) , Russian federal employees continuously express dissatisfaction with pay (Huskey and Obolonsky 2003; Rogozin et al. 2013) . Especially middle-and lower-level offi cials perceive their wages as low and insuffi cient (Atnashev 2017) . Little research exists about pay dissatisfaction among Russia's 306,500 municipal employees. Russia has a two-tier local government system with some 24,000 municipalities. Some 1,700 upper-tier municipal districts deliver public health care and primary education. Some 19,000 lower-tier authorities are responsible for services such as road construction, land use planning, garbage collection, and electric power supply (Ermasova and Mokeev 2016; Leksin 2016) . 560 city districts deliver those services as a bulk.
Th is study uses an original data set of municipal employees in the Stavropol region to investigate the correlates of pay dissatisfaction in Russian local government. Th e Stavropol region is an agricultural region in the Caucasian part of European Russia, serving the interests of some 2.8 million inhabitants (Federal State Statistics Service 2017, 55) . Local government in the Stavropol region operates under a two-tier system. As of 2018, the region is divided into 201 municipalities, 17 one-tier city districts and 16 upper-tier municipal districts encompassing 168 lower-tier urban and rural settlements (Federal State Statistics Service 2018) . Th e research questions are:
1. How dissatisfi ed are municipal employees in Russia's Stavropol region with their pay ?
2. What factors correlate with reported levels of pay dissatisfaction ?
Th is study addresses the overarching research question how work-related attitudes and motives of public employees impact the performance of public organizations. Understanding pay dissatisfaction is the fi rst step to attract talent into the civil service and to continuously motivate a diverse public sector workforce. We attempt to build an understanding of work satisfaction in Russia, and how it is aff ected by diff erent attitudinal factors. Although local offi cials in Russia play a pivotal role in peoples' well-being, they are the "agents of regional and federal governments rather than independent professionals serving their local communities" (Leksin 2016, 8) . Local budgets heavily rely on federal and regional grants. Increasing living standards of a growing middle class and the Putin consensus ("social benefi ts in return for electoral support") created a relatively stable hybrid regime but never translated into a positive perception of public agencies and their employees. Th ere is little belief among citizens that public offi cials are capable of serving community members eff ectively (Jakobson 2001; Jakobson et al. 2018) . Dissatisfi ed employees tend to leave the bureaucracy (Lee and Whitford 2008; Moynihan and Pandey 2008) .
Theory and Hypotheses

Pay dissatisfaction
Research in the US administrative context established four dimensions of pay satisfaction: satisfaction with pay level, pay rise, pay administration, and benefi ts (Heneman and Schwab 1985; Scarpello et al. 1988) . Cross-cultural research shows that the dimensions of pay satisfaction might vary across diff erent cultural contexts (Lievens et al. 2007 ). To minimize the risk of "breaking responses into a number of dimensions that are not diff erentially distinguishable by a target population" (Carraher and Buckley 1996, 106) this study uses and measures overall pay dissatisfaction. Pay dissatisfaction in this study is defi ned as a situation in which an individual is dissatisfi ed with her salary from public-sector employment. We understand and conceptualized pay dissatisfaction as an attitude, encompassing an aff ective, a cognitive, and a behavioral component. Municipal employees may perceive their salary gained from public employment as too low or unfair for a variety of reasons, and this perception may induce diff erent types of behavior. Th e aff ective component of an attitude captures a person's emotion or feeling about an object or event, in our case, pay dissatisfaction. For example, some researchers view pay satisfaction "as a discrepancy between how much one feels one should receive and how much one feels is actually received" (Heneman and Schwab 1985, 129 -130) . Th e cognitive component captures an employee's belief or perceived knowledge about pay dissatisfaction, e.g. the belief that there are unjustifi ed pay gaps within one's organization. Th e behavioral component of pay dissatisfaction captures an employee's reactions to the feeling of being underpaid, including decreasing productivity, voicing complaints, or leaving the organization.
Perception of public-sector compensation
Expectancy value theory states that people choose jobs from which they expect rewards that they value (Ryan and Deci 2017, 349) . Stable income is a main job motivator among public employees in Russia (Atnashev 2017) and predicts sector choices of graduates around the globe (Braunstein and Haines 1968; Jäkel and Borshchevskiy 2019; Ko and Jun 2015; Lewis and Frank 2002; McGinnis and Ng 2016) . "Th ose who place great value on job security and service to the public should be more likely to choose government jobs, while those who place a higher priority on pay should prefer whichever sector they think will pay them the most" (Lewis and Frank 2002) . Public sector compensation schemes historically prioritize internal wage equity, modest pay rates, strong nonwage benefi t packages, and relative job security (Llorens 2015) . Individuals who value social benefi ts as a part of modest, but stable and relatively secure income including social benefi ts, are likely to report low levels of pay dissatisfaction.
Hypothesis 1: a municipal employee who perceives public employment as a source of stable and secure income is likely to report a low level of pay dissatisfaction.
Perception of social impact
Altruism is a key variable of interest in the job satisfaction literature (Homberg et al. 2015; Ritz et al. 2016) . Altruism, or prosocial motivation "refl ects one's desire to expend eff ort to benefi t other people" (Liu et al. 2016) , and closely links to the concept of public service motivation (PSM) (Perry 1996; Perry et al. 2010; Perry and Vandenabeele 2015; Perry and Wise 1990) . Empirical evidence robustly confi rms the notion that there is a positive relationship between PSM and job satisfaction (Homberg et al. 2015; Ritz et al. 2016; Vandenabeele and Van Loon 2015, 375) . Public-sector employees self-report a higher level of altruism, public service-oriented motives, and a stronger perception of the social impact of their job compared to their counterparts in the business sector, in a wide range of countries, including Russia (Bullock et al. 2015) . Following person-job-fi t theories (Holland 1959; Parson 1909; Schneider 1987) and PSM theory we posit that people who are willing "to engage in sacrifi cial behaviors for the good of others without reciprocal benefi ts for themselves" (Perry and Vandenabeele 2015) experience satisfaction from public-sector employment. Th is is likely to induce pay satisfaction despite non-competitive pay.
Hypothesis 3a:
A municipal employee who perceives public employment as a chance to help others is likely to report a low level of pay dissatisfaction.
Hypothesis 3b: A municipal employee for whom public employment is an opportunity to serve her country is likely to report a low level of pay dissatisfaction.
Hypothesis 3c: A municipal employee for whom public employment is an opportunity to change something in society is likely to report a low level of pay dissatisfaction.
Security motivation
Public organizations traditionally have been risk-averse "because of the public accountability and protection of vulnerable people imperatives" (Osborne and Brown 2008, 172, 178) . Given this incentive structure, individuals who value the status quo and stability over risky changes are expected to accept non-competitive wages in the public sector.
Hypothesis 4:
A municipal employee who values security is likely to report a low level of pay dissatisfaction.
Attitudes to unethical behavior
Negative self-selection theory posits that corrupt people self-select the public sector (Hanna and Wang 2017) . Russia ranks 131 st (out of 176) in Transparency International's perceived corruption index, far behind the other BRIC countries. Th e ideological turn in the 1990s nullifi ed old ethical norms but failed to establish new moral standards (Nezhina and Barabashev 2017) . Th ere is a widespread perception of top-level (Public Opinion 2013; Rimskii 2013) and everyday street-level corruption (Reisinger et al. 2017 ).
Public anti-corruption campaigns seek to win public support as a source of political legitimacy (Zhu et al. 2017 ) by signaling a zero-tolerance policy regarding non-ethical behavior in the civil service. We argue that these signals have changed the incentive structure for civil servants: Municipal offi cials who deviate from organizational norms, for reasons such as convenience, or favoring friends, may experience less valued rewards from public employment. We thus hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 5: A municipal employee who states a positive attitude towards unethical behavior, such as bribery and rule-bending, is likely to report a high level of pay dissatisfaction.
Method
Th e binary logistic regression model was used to test our hypotheses empirically. In late autumn 2016 all about 7,400 municipal employees in Russia's Stavropol region were invited to participate in the study by answering an online questionnaire over the course of a two-week period. A particular sampling strategy was not applied. Recipients were informed that their participation was fully voluntary and anonymous, and that they could skip any question in the questionnaire. Recipients who agreed to partake were redirected to a webpage of a commercial company that hosted the survey interface. We received 501 fi nished questionnaires, and 486 persons responded to every question, which eff ectively is a 7 percent response rate. Observations with incomplete responses were not included in the empirical analysis. While not a random sample the demographic makeup of our sample of convenience is representative of all municipal employees in the Stavropol region in terms of sex (Table 1) . However, we cannot reject the possibility that respondents diff er from non-respondents in terms of non-demographic characteristics, such as personality. 
Measurement
To our knowledge, the dimensionality and validity of several constructs used in this study so far has not been assessed in the Russian administrative context. Th erefore, the questions asked in the survey conducted for this study were not selected from existing validated scales. Nonetheless, the items in this study have a high degree of face validity as they closely match with known dimensions from previous research.
Dependent variable -Th e well-established pay satisfaction questionnaire (PSQ) measures satisfaction with pay level, pay rise, pay administration, and benefi ts (Heneman and Schwab 1985; Scarpello et al. 1988 ). Similar to alternative constructs, such as the Minnesota Satisfaction Questionnaire, this study focuses on (dis)satisfaction with pay scale. Th e survey asked respondents to state to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: "I am not satisfi ed with my pay" (reverse), and provided fi ve options: 1=strongly disagree, 2=rather disagree, 3=neutral, 4=rather agree, 5=strongly agree. Options 4 and 5 were indicative of respondents who are dissatisfi ed with pay, responses were recoded as 1=pay dissatisfaction; whereas options 1, 2, 3 were indicative of satisfaction with pay, responses were recoded 0=no pay dissatisfaction.
Independent variables -Th is study measures perception of social impact with three diff erent survey items that closely refl ect the dimensions of the public service motivation (PSM) construct (Perry 1996) . Perception of compensation and benefi ts are each measured with a single survey item. Security motivation is measured with four survey items (Cronbach's alpha=0.79) that capture four counterfactual incidents relevant to Russian public employees (downgrading of job position, verbal warning about underperformance, written warning before dismissal, and no fi nancial bonus). Four separate survey items are used to measure attitudes on unethical behavior. Survey items for all variables are reported in the appendix.
Results
Th e average municipal employee in our sample is female (79 percent), and has between seven and 15 years of working experience. 72 percent of respondents reported that they were dissatisfi ed with pay (Table 2 ). Each independent variable was regressed on all other independent variables to obtain VIF scores and detect eventually high multicollinearity. VIF scores ranged from 1.77 to 1.04, well below a commonly accepted threshold of 2.5 or higher. None of the independent variables are signifi cantly correlated beyond 0.51; which also indicates that multicollinearity is not a concern in our dataset. Table 2 displays descriptions and a correlation matrix for all variables. Table 3 in the Appendix displays estimation results.
Compensation perception
Hypothesis 1 states that municipal employees who perceive their job as a source of stable and secure income and benefi ts are likely to report a low level of pay dissatisfaction. Th e odds ratios indicate that as income perception increases respondents become less likely to report pay dissatisfaction, supporting Hypothesis 1. For a municipal employee who strongly perceives public employment as a source of stable income the odds of reporting pay dissatisfaction is about 4 -5 times less likely (odds ratio=0.235, p<0.01, Table 3 in the Appendix) than the odds for a municipal employee who totally disagrees with this perception. For a municipal employee who perceives public employment as a source of social benefi ts, the odds of stating pay dissatisfaction is 2.6 times smaller (odds ratio=0.452, p<0.1) than the odds for a municipal employee who absolutely disagrees with this view. For all other response categories we found no signifi cant diff erences in pay dissatisfaction compared to the base category.
Perception of social impact
Th e perception of the social impact of public employment is found to be no meaningful predictor of pay dissatisfaction among municipal employees. Estimation results provide no support for Hypotheses 3a-3c.
Risk-awareness
Hypothesis 4 states that a municipal employee who values security is likely to report a low level of pay dissatisfaction. Hypothesis 4 is partly supported. For a municipal employee who reports a moderate level of security motivation the odds of expressing dissatisfaction is twice as large (response category 2, odds ratio=2.441, p<0.05) than for a municipal employee who reports a low level of security motivation (for details on the measurement, please see the Appendix).
Attitudes on bribery and rule-bending
Hypothesis 5 states that a municipal employee who tolerates rule-bending or bribery under certain conditions is more likely to express dissatisfaction with pay. We fi nd only partial support for Hypothesis 5. We found no signifi cant diff erences in pay dissatisfaction across attitudes towards rule-bending in order to support friends. A municipal employee who tends to tolerate bribery in return for handling complex documents is three times more likely (odds ratio=3.078, p<0.05) to express dissatisfaction with pay compared to a municipal employee who does not tolerate bribery.
Table 2
Description and correlation matrix for all variables Cause and eff ect between the attitudes on unethical behavior and pay dissatisfaction might be reversed. One might argue that municipal employees engage in behavior that violates ethical norms of the profession, such as taking bribes, because they perceive their income as too low or unfair (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001) . Th ough "the literature provides important theoretical arguments linking pay levels with corruption, evidence [is] mixed with regard to their validity" (Meyer-Sahling et al. 2018 ).
Tenure
We fi nd that a municipal employee with 4 -6 years of working experience is 4 times more likely to state pay dissatisfaction than a job entrant in the fi rst year of public employment. For a municipal employee with more than seven years of working experience the odds of stating pay dissatisfaction are two times larger than the odds for a fi rst-year job entrant.
Discussion
Russian culture and voice
Why do municipal employees in Russia display such a remarkable level of pay dissatisfaction ? A fi rst interpretation centers on the peculiarities of Russian (work) culture. Voicing and displaying complaints is a common behavior both in work-related and daily-life contexts. Th e logic is that people who do not voice dissatisfaction will get nothing at all. Empirical studies conducted in the late 1980s and early 1990s found that Russian employees "ascribe a lower status to work" than people in other parts of the world, suggesting that most people never really accepted "the offi cial Soviet ideology, which proclaimed work a universal obligation and the most important sphere of life" (Magun 1998, 27) . Research on cultural diff erences regarding individualism and collectivism (Triandis 2001) highlighted that "[i]n a collectivist culture work for the individual is not so much an act of self-fulfi llment or self-expression, but is primarily a means to support a family" (Vadi and Vereshagin 2006) . Russian employees have been reported to strongly agree with the statement "the better they [the employer] pay, the more I do", indicating an "orientation toward an equivalent, fair exchange between their labor contribution and their expected material reward" (Magun 1998, 28) . Th is suggests that in situations with the decision whether to speak up (i.e. employee voice behavior) or to remain silent (Morrison 2011) , Russian employees tend to voice their dissatisfaction with pay, which can be understood as a legitimate, though indirect attempt to ask for a pay increase.
Wage gaps
Our second interpretation centers on multiple wage gaps and a perception of lagging behind. Prior research shows that social comparisons predict pay dissatisfac-tion above and beyond actual pay (Sweeney and McFarlin 2004; Taylor and Vest 1992) . While external comparisons may induce pay dissatisfaction, personal comparisons among peers tend to increase satisfaction with pay (Taylor and Vest 1992) . For example, Russian municipal employees in a large-scale study by Rogozin et al. (2013) explicitly stated that the level of wages in comparison with alternatives in a small town was the main reason for taking a position in municipal services.
Our fi ndings suggest that municipal employees are sensitive to multiple public-public wage gaps: the gap between pay in diff erent regions, the gap between pay increases in diff erent regions, and the gap between federal and municipal employment. Regional wage gap: On average, municipal employees in the Stavropol region earn less than the national average (37,338 Rubles per month, about 500 Euros), especially less than in industrialized regions around, for example, St. Petersburg (41,682 Rubles per month, about 550 Euros). Pay increase gap: Across all 85 regions of Russia, average monthly salaries of municipal employees in 2016 increased by 1.5 percent compared to 2015. In the Stavropol region the average monthly salary of municipal employees has virtually not changed, while municipal employees in neighboring regions saw increases between 1.6 and 15.1 percent. Federal-local wage gap: Th e gap between salaries of regionally employed federal and local municipal offi cials is larger in the Stavropol region than in other parts of Russia. On average, a municipal employee in the Stavropol region earns 87 percent of what a regionally employed federal offi cial (e.g. in a regional branch of the federal ministry of the interior) gets per month. Th is is more compared to neighboring regions, such as Chechnya (55.6 percent), but less than the national average (89.5 percent). Th e federal-local wage gap in those less developed regions contrasts with Moscow and St. Petersburg, where municipal employees earn 40 and 21 percent more than federal employees, respectively. Th is implies that pay dissatisfaction results from upward pay comparison (Brewer and Weber 1994; Lockwood and Kunda 1997) . Municipal employees make external comparisons with seemingly better-off federal and municipal employees in distant regions when forming their expectations.
Conclusion
Th is study investigates how compensation perceptions, perception of the social impact of public employment, risk-awareness, attitudes towards unethical behavior, and working experience aff ect pay dissatisfaction among municipal employees in Russia's Stavropol region. Our survey data display a remarkably high level of pay dissatisfaction. We fi nd that pay dissatisfaction results from negative perceptions of public employment compensation, relatively low levels of risk-aversion, unethical professional attitudes, and more than 4 years of working experience.
Practical relevance
We argue that pay dissatisfaction poses a serious threat to sustainable rural development in Russia, and in the Stavropol region in particular. Th e Stavropol region ranked 67 th (out of 80) among Russian regions in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2010. In 2013 the per capita gross regional product (GRP) of the Stavropol region was 50 percent of the national average (Zubarevich 2013, 130) . Th e Stavropol region's economy is dominated by agriculture. Below-national-average education levels and workforce productivity, underdevelopment of non-agricultural activities, and an aging population pose serious threats to the region's required sustainable rural development (Erokhin et al. 2014) . Federal government launched a target program to establish umbrella conditions to spur the diversifi cation of rural economics. Th e successful practical implementation, such as development of rural infrastructure, selection and co-production with local stakeholders and society requires bold eff orts by regional and municipal administration.
Limitations
Our study has several limitations. One limitation is that we use single, self-reported survey items to measure both the dependent variable and the independent variables, while the use of multi-item measures from multiple sources (Podsakoff et al. 2012 ) would be preferable. Hence, estimated eff ects may suff er from a common source bias (Jakobsen and Jensen 2015) . Th e use of diff erent sources, conduction of a panel study (Jakobsen and Jensen 2015) or experimental studies with municipal employees in Russia still faces various practical obstacles, as most "bureaucratic organizations prefer to remain closed to outside observers" (Gimpelson et al. 2009 ). Another limitation is the relatively small response rate. Despite these limitations this study contributes to the knowledge and better understanding of Russia's public administration from a behavioral perspective.
Complex documents justify extra money (factor variable; response option 1=base category) 
A2. Measurement of independent variables
Perception of social impact -Th e survey asked respondents to state to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following three statements (from 1=strongly disagree, to 5=strongly agree) as indicative of their perception of the impact of public employment on society: (1) To me public employment off ers an opportunity to help people (sample mean value=4.14), (2) public employment is a patriotic service to the motherland (mean value=3.79), (3) public employment is an opportunity to change something in society and the world (mean value=3.13). Th e most frequent outcome category for the fi rst two statements is option (4), i.e. the average respondent self-reports a strong perception of being able to help others and serving one's country, which points to potential refl exive behavior of participants and a desired social response (DSR) bias. We refl ect this potential issue by considering option 4 as the "default response"; option 5 was thus indicative of respondents who "truly" perceive public employment as an opportunity to help others and serve one's country.
Responses were recoded as 1=perceived opportunity to help others (serve one's country). Options 1 to 4 were indicative of either a low perception of the social impact of public employment or a socially desired response, responses were recoded as 0=no perceived opportunity to help others (serve one's country).
Compensation perceptions -We asked respondents to judge the following two statements as indicative of their perception of public sector compensation (from 1=strongly disagree, to 5=strongly agree): (1) Public administration for me means stable, increasing income (mean value=2.74), (2) public administration off ers an opportunity to receive social benefi ts (mean value=2.67).
Security motivation -Th e survey asked respondents to state how seriously the following four counterfactual incidences (Cronbach's alpha=0.79, sample mean value=4.22) posed a risk to them, and provided fi ve options: from 1=absolutely not important to 5=very important.
(1) Downgrading of job position (sample mean value=4.35), (2) a non-written warning, e.g. that the level of knowledge or performance is not suffi cient (sample mean value=4.3), (3) written warning before dismissal (sample mean value=4.18), (4) no fi nancial bonus (sample mean=4.05). All four counterfactual incidents are perceived as serious risks. Option 5=very important risk, was thus indicative of a respondent with a level of risk-awareness above sample average and was recoded as 1=security motivation, whereas options 1=ab-solutely not important risk, to 4=rather important risk, were indicative of relatively low risk-awareness and recoded as 0=no security motivation. Th e cumulative score of the four binary variables ({1, 2, 3, 4}) is included in the model.
Attitudes on unethical behavior -Respondents were asked to state to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the following four statements (from 1=strongly disagree, to 5=strongly agree), as indicative of their attitudes towards behavior that may fall below ethical and professional standards: (1) deviating from the usual procedure is alright, if nobody gets harmed (mean value=2.34), (2) if you can help a friend it is alright to deviate from the regular procedure (mean value=2.14), (3) if processing documents is really complicated, civil servants should receive some extra money from the customer (mean value=2.12), (4) if civil servants receive a low salary it is okay if they receive additional income from help or work (mean value=1.56).
